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Impediments  to international trade are conventionally  classified  into tariff and nontariff
barriers.  The substantial set of nontariff barriers impeding trade in agricultural products may
be usefully partitioned into a number of subsets, one of which is labelled technical barriers to
trade.'  Within this subset, 'are health and sanitary regulations.  It has been established that,
under  specific  assumptions,  there  are  equivalences  between  tariffs  and  certain  nontariff
barriers, e.g.,  import quotas.  However, these assumptions do not include either market failure
in the form of negative externalities, which may appear only after some delay,  or uncertainties
about the realization of these externalities.  Both are prominent  characteristics  of the  situations
in which sanitary and phytosanitary regulations are found.  Hence, an assessment of the trade
effects of these regulations requires non-standard techniques of analysis.
Regulation by a government agency is the favored approach to the control of 'imported
externalities'  such as exotic crop pests and diseases.  Associated with such externalities  are
possibly low and, invariably,  vague probabilities.  The probabilities are vague because very
often there is no empirical evidence  on which to form objective or even  subjective judgements
of their size.  Such 'low probability,  high consequence'  events,  in general,  create difficulties
for  public  policy and  the policy process  (Camerer  and  Kunreuther  1989).  Camerer  and
Kunreuther review  decision processes for such events  and draw  on examples such as the
wearing  of seat belts and the siting of hazardous waste plants, to illustrate  the alternative
theoretical  and practical approaches to public policy in the presence  of such market failures.
In doing so, they consider  some models based on the axiomatic approach  and others based
on practical rules of thumb.  Both of these approaches might be usefully applied to sanitary
and  phytosanitary  barriers  to  international  trade  as  a  basis  for  developing  a  theoretical
framework for analysing  such trade policies.
The principal purposes in this paper are first, to provide a theoretical framework for the
analysis of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and second, to evaluate the implications  of
this framework for trade policy analysis.  The institutional context provided by the Agreement
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the Uruguay Round  [the  SPS
Agreement]  is  summarised.  In  late  1994,  the  Australian  Government  was  faced  with
unprecedented  requests for bulk imports of cereals,  requests that were necessitated by the
sustained drought in eastern Australian which reduced grain output.  The pragmatic, rules-of-
thumb approach adopted by the Commonwealth  Government to evaluate the risks of such
'The  other subsets  may be headed quantitative restrictions, nontariff charges,  government
participation in trade and restrictive practices,  and customs  procedures  and administrative
practices (Hillman 1995).
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under uncertainty are discussed, with attention being paid particularly to those theories which
have characteristics  of special significance for public policy decisions on SPS regulations.  An
example is provided which illustrates the use of non-additive probabilities as  a representation
of the decision maker's aversion to uncertainty,  i.e., to the vague  probabilities of importing
potentially  harmful  exotic pests and  diseases.  The risk assessment requirement  of the SPS
Agreement,  the lessons provided by the Australian case study, and the results of a model of
decision  making under uncertainty  are brought  together,  and their implications  for  trade
policy explored.
Aspects  of the SPS Agreement
With the implementation of the Agreements of the Uruguay Round, the national  sanitary
and phytosanitary  regulations of the Members of the World Trade Organization  [WTO]  are
now subject to the Agreement  on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.
A sanitary and phytosanitary measure  is defined as:
[a]ny  measure  applied:  to protect  animal  or  plant  life  or  health  within the
territory of the Member from risks arising from entry, establishment  or spread of
pests,  diseases,  disease-carrying  organisms  or  disease-causing  organisms;
(Annex A,  la).
Under this Agreement, Members have the right to use these measures  (Article 2, para.  1)
but only to the extent  shown necessary by scientific evidence  (Article 2,  para. 2).  Members
are encouraged to base their measures on international  standards  (Article 3, para. 1),  although
they  may  set their  own,  higher  standards  if there  is  scientific  justification  based  on  an
assessment of risk (Article 3, para. 3).
Article  5 of the Agreement  is  headed  "Assessment  of Risk  and  Determination  of the
Appropriate Level of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Protection."  Risk assessment is defined  as:
[t]he  evaluation  of the likelihood  of entry,  establishment  or spread  of a pest  or
disease within the territory of an importing member  according to the  sanitary  or
phytosanitary  measures which  might  be applied,  and  of the  associated  potential
biological  and  economic  consequences;  or the  evaluation  of the  potential  for
adverse  effects  on human  or animal health  arising from  additives,  contaminants,
toxins or disease-causing  organisms  in food,
beverages and feedstuffs.  (Annex A, para. 4).
The appropriate level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection is defined  as:
[t]he level of protection deemed appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary
or phytosanitary measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within the
territory.  (Annex  A, para.  5).  This  definition is sometimes  abbreviated  to the
'acceptable  level of risk.'
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attention to scientific evidence,  environmental  conditions, quarantine  treatment,  economic
factors including losses from production and costs of eradication,  and negative trade effects
(Article 5, paras 2-5).  It is recognized  that relevant scientific evidence may not always be
available  and provisional  measures may be  adopted.  However,  there  is  an obligation  on
Members  to obtain the  necessary  data in order  to complete  an objective  risk  assessment
(Article 5, para.  7).
Pest Risk Analysis
The Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service [AQIS] is responsible for administering
the conditions under which imports of  plant material enter the country.  These conditions are
determined  partly  by  the  Quarantine  Act  1908  and  the  framework  provided  by  the
International Plant Protection Convention [IPPC]  (Phillips et al.  1994).  The IPPC defines a
quarantinable  pest to be "[a]  pest of potential national economic importance to the country
endangered thereby and not yet present there,  or present but not yet widely distributed and
being actively  controlled."  (Phillips  1994, p.  7).  A pest is defined as "any  form of plant  or
animal  life,  or  any pathogenic  agents,  injurious  or potentially  injurious  to  plants  or plant
products"  (Phillips 1994, p. 7).  Using the IPPC framework, AQIS classifies imported  seeds
into:  those which are prohibited under the Quarantine  Act  1908;  those which are restricted,
i.e.,  importable under  conditions  determined by  AQIS;  and those  which are unrestricted,
although still subject to accepted  plant health  standards.
The information  required to undertake  a formal risk assessment analysis of a potential
quarantinable pest is:  first, to determine whether the particular exotic pest is present in the
imported material;  second, whether the pest will survive quarantine inspection;  and third,
whether the pest will establish and spread.  Usually,  this type of information  is not available
because  it is  difficult  to acquire  in the absence  of accidents  or comparative  international
studies which could provide data.  Therefore,  in  1994, in the face of increasing  demands by
end-users of  bulk food and feed cereals,  AQIS had to make an assessment  of the previously
unknown  risks  involved  in  permitting  such  bulk  imports  and  did  so  by  commissioning
scientific research.  At the same time a Grain Import Task Force was established to consider
the evidence and to process requests for import licenses.
The objective of the Pest Risk Analysis  [PRA]  which was undertaken  in late 1994 for
AQIS was to establish the size of the risks involved in the bulk importation of specific grains
from Canada  and the United States  [US].  The  approach taken was:  first, to identify  the
exotic pest groups which could be a source of risk in the Australian environment;  second, to
consider  three  management  protocols  for  handling  each  type  of grain  if it were  to be
imported;  and third, to estimate probabilities of various  combinations of pest groups and
management  protocols.  No  attempt  was  made  to undertake  an  economic  cost-benefit
analysis.
First, the pest groups were identified as i] seed-borne diseases and storage pests, ii] weed
species which could be imported along with the grain, and iii] foot and mouth disease from
257untreated feedgrain.  For seed-borne diseases, an inventory was compiled of diseases endemic
to Australia  and of diseases which are exotic to Australia but endemic to potential  source
countries for grains.  For the feedgrains,  barley,  sorghum and maize, it was found that in the
exotic category there were 2 bacteria,  21  fungi, 4 viruses and 2 storage pests (Phillips  1994).
For weed  seeds, there were two potential  sources of risk:  the seeds  may  carry diseases
harmful  to  cultivated  crops;  and  they may  establish  and  spread,  so  displacing  native
vegetation.  Around thirty weeds not present in Australia but found in the grain-growing  areas
of the US and Canada, were identified (Phillips  1994).
Second,  a  qualitative .assessment  was  made  of the  risks  under  three  management
protocols.  These protocols were:  P1 - steam treatment  (95°C for ten minutes) of grain in
the metropolitan area before rural delivery,  this is a strategy for which there is no previous
commercial experience  for the volumes of grain involved;  P2 - cracking (kibbling)  of grain
in the metropolitan area before rural delivery;  and  P3 - direct  delivery of unprocessed grain
to the feedlots where the grain is steam pelleted at 95°C-97°C  for 30-45  minutes (Phillips et
al.  1994).  The issues of concern with respect to risk are summarized  in Figure  1.
Third, an assessment was made of the factors which might affect the probabilities  of pests
being introduced  and becoming  established.  Pests were identified  as air-borne (e.g.,  fungal
and  rust  spores),  seed-borne  (e.g.,  mosaic  viruses)  and  soil-borne  (e.g.,  viruses).  For
example, in the case of a seed-borne disease some assessment is necessary for the following
events:  "pathogen present in the seed,  seed establishment, disease  establishment on the host
and transmission to other hosts.  Each of these has a probability of occurrence but often few
data are available  on key events"  (Phillips  et al.  1994).  Putting together the range of pests
and weed groups for each grain, the economic significance  of each grain to Australia, and the
risks involved in each protocol,  enabled a range of probabilities to be established.  These are
summarized in Table  1.
With respect to the source and type of grain, the risk was lowest for Canadian barley and
highest for US  maize.  For example,  taking  Stewart's  disease on maize (Erwina  stewartii),
Phillips  et  al.  reported the  following probability  estimates.  For the  event:  'rate  of seed
infection'  the probability was estimated to be 0.8;  for 'seed  establishment'  the figure was
0.01;  for the event 'disease establishment  on the host'  estimated  probability was 0.0007;  and
for 'transmission to other hosts'  estimated probability was 0.01.  Based on a spillage of 500
kg of maize  from a 30,000 tonne  shipment,  the chances  of the disease  establishment  was
estimated to be 0.224.  With respect to management protocol, P1 provides the lowest risk and
P3 the highest.
The PRA not only established absolute qualitative  ranges of probabilities (Table  1) but
also established comparative quantitative ranges with respect to other quarantine risks.  For
example, it was found that the potential risks from grain spillage under P3 might be as much
as  seventeen  times  greater  than  the  risks  from  contaminated  seed  imported  under  the
unrestricted  category.  It was  also concluded that  the risks of quarantinable  pests being
brought  in legally by travellers were not negligible but were small in comparison with the
potential  risks from bulk imports of grain.  These comparisons  illustrate  the point made
below, that decision makers'  preferences are more clearly formed in comparative  situations.








Issues of Concern End Use
*whole grain  consumption
contamination (some  (bread making)
viable grains present)
*delitus
Figure 1.  Sources and ranges of risk.
Source:  adapted from Phillips et al.  (1994,  p. 24)
Table 1.  Level  of risk from nests and weeds
a - Risk is measured with  respect to the range of pests and weeds  for each
cereal and with respect to the economic  significance  of the crop.
b - For a definition of each Protocol,  see the text above.
c - L.  Low risk;  M, Medium risk;  and H,  High risk.
Source:  Phillips et al.  (1994,  p. 30)
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Management  Strategy  Level  of Risk
________________  Barley  Sorghum  Wheat  Maize
PJb  L  L  L  L
P2  L  L  M  M-H
P3  L  M.  M-H  H  i
IOn the basis of the  scientific  and judgemental  evidence  provided  by the PRA, AQIS
implemented  protocol P3.  There was an outcry from the  Grains  Council of Australia  on
behalf of domestic grain growers because of their perception  of the risks from spilled grain.
This  anxiety was justified given  one  of the conclusions  by Phillips  et  al.  (1994,  p.  32):
"[o]verall  these data indicate that there may be a significant weed risk by the spillage of grain
along the transport route if spillage is not detected and cleaned up."  After there was evidence
of grain spillage from covered trucks in rural areas,  the Commonwealth Government passed
legislation which restricted movement of grain to sealed tankers and, in rural areas, banned
on-site processing  by end-users  unless steps were taken to control dust clouds.  However,
even with these additional restrictions,  grains growers remained  cautious about the ability of
AQIS to monitor and to quarantine exotic pests and diseases imported in bulk shipments of
grains from Canada and the US.
Uncertainty Aversion
A government considering a decision to loosen its quarantine regulations on a previously
banned  imported  agricultural  product,  e.g.,  bulk grain,  is faced  with the uncertain  future
outcomes of that decision on the domestic environment.  It is  also faced,  of course,  with
affecting  domestic  markets  for grains  and for products  which  use grains  as intermediate
inputs.  However,  neither this aspect nor the political economy dimension of policy (e.g.,  that
of favoring one group of producers over another) is the focus in this paper.
The decision problem facing the government  may be formulated  in the following way.
There  are  three  primitive  concepts,  namely,  consequences,  acts  and  states  of nature.
Consequences  (or outcomes  or payoffs) may be thought of as the welfare or utility of the
decision maker.  In the context of import regulations, and in the absence of political economy
considerations,  it is social welfare rather than private welfare which measures consequences
for the government as decision maker.  Acts are the possible decisions which the government
can choose to make.  Corresponding to every act, there is a subset  of the set of consequences,
the particular consequence  depending on the actual state of nature which  occurs.  The set of
states of nature is assumed here to be finite.  In summary, acts are functions from the set of
states  of nature to  the  set  of consequences  (Karni  and  Schmeidler  1991).  In  order  to
determine which act to choose, it is necessary to define a preference relation over the set of
acts.  A preference relation is defined as:
a binary  relation, f, on A  [the set of acts] that is  (i)  complete, i.e.,  for all a, b E
A  either, a fb or b f a, and (ii) transitive, i.e.,  for  all a, b, c EA, a fb and b fc
imply a fc (Karni and  Schmeidler  1991).
This  relation  requires  an  evaluation  of the  consequences  of each  act  together  with  a
judgement about the realization of these consequences.
One of  the foundations of  rational choice in non-deterministic situations is the assumption
that it is possible for the decision maker to separate preferences  about consequences from
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individual's beliefs about uncertain events is represented by a unique and additive subjective
probability  distribution  defined  over  the  set  of all  possible  states  of the  world;  and
preferences  over consequences  are linear in these probabilities.  The decision maker is then
assumed to choose the act for which the subjective expected utility is largest.  Let S = {s1, s2,
... , s,} be the finite set of all possible states, x(s) be the consequence of an act X  cA  if state
s c S occurs, and p(s) be the subjective probability of state s.  Then an act Xis represented
by the vector (x(s,), p(s,);  x(s2), p(s2); ... ; x(sn), p(so)) (Camerer and Weber 1992).  Consider
another act Y EA.  Then in a comparison between acts X and  Y, either X is strictly preferred
to (f) Y, Xis indifferent to (-) Y, or Y is strictly preferred to X.  The comparison  is based on
the evaluation of
SEU(a)  =  Ep(s)  U(a(s))
aeA  sES  (1)
where U(a(s)) is the utility associated with the consequence of act a when the state of nature
is s.
Despite the widespread  acceptance  of SEU as the 'normative  benchmark'  for rational
decision making in the absence of certainty,  a number of results in experimental economics,
beginning with the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg  1961), have challenged  the assumptions upon
which  SEU  is based  and have shown  it not to be a good  descriptive  theory (Kelsey  and
Quiggin 1992; Camerer and Weber 1992; Karni and Schmeidler  1991).  Of these assumptions,
only one will be highlighted in what follows, namely, the way in which beliefs are represented
by probabilities.3
A distinction is usually made between risk and uncertainty:  under risk, it is assumed that
the  decision maker can assign known,  objective  probabilities to the states  of nature,  i.e.,
beliefs can be represented by a single probability distribution;  under uncertainty,  it is assumed
that the decision maker is unsure of the probability distribution, i.e.,  the probabilities of the
states of nature are said to be vague or ambiguous  (Camerer and Weber  1992).  Hogarth  and
Kunreuther have taken the typology further by suggesting that knowledge of outcomes should
be classified  as precise,  ambiguous or none (ignorance).  With probabilities being classified
in the  same  way,  this gives  a 3 x 3 table,  with the  cells  ranging  from precise-precise  to
2This separation  has been criticized as inappropriate, for example, by Nau.  Such separation
depends on the validity of the independence/sure-thing  axiom, the experimental  evidence for
which suggests that decision makers consistently violate such assumed behavior.  Moreover,
in practice, what is observed is the product of probability and utility, thereby masking what
might be state-dependent utility.
3It will be assumed in what follows that governments  and the community are prepared to
trade-off potential damage to the rural environment from imported grains.  In practice, such
trade- offs may not be entertained,  i.e., dollars and environmental damage may be part of the
government's multi-attribute utility function but may enter in a way which does not permit
the trade-off.  For a  discussion of this  point  in public  policy  making,  see  Camerer  and
Kunreuther.
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appropriate to consider the ambiguous-ambiguous  case.
Ellsberg showed that his  subjects had a preference for betting on known rather than on
less well-known probabilities in a way which was inconsistent with the assumed behaviour in
SEU  theory.  In  SEU  theory,  this  distinction  makes  no  sense  because  all  subjective
probabilities  are known to  the decision maker.  Ellsberg's  contribution  was to  show that
decision makers do distinguish between known and unknown probabilities.  For example, in
his '3-colour problem'  a decision maker is faced with an urn containing  30 red balls and 60
balls which are either black or yellow but in unknown proportions.  The decision maker is
offered a set of gambles in which the amount won is $100 and the amount lost is $0.  The four
gambles are:  A - win (W)  if a red ball (R) is drawn;  B - win if a black ball (B)  is drawn;
C - win if a red ball or a yellow  (Y)  ball is drawn;  D - win if a black  or a yellow ball is
drawn.  In choosing between gambles A  and B, most subjects chose A; but between gambles
C and D, most chose D.  This outcome violates  SEU theory for the following reason.  Let
p(R), p(Bl), andp(Y) be the subjective probabilities  of drawing a red,  a black or a yellow ball,
respectively.  In SEU theory, gamble A fB iffp(R)U(W) > p(Bl)U(W), i.e.,  iffp(R)  >  p(B).
Moreover, D f C implies p(BI u Y) > p(R u Y).  If probabilities  are additive, then p(BJ u Y)
=p(B)  +p(Y) (:p(Bln iY)  = 0) andp(R u Y) =p(R) +p(Y).  Hence D fC implies thatp(B)
> p(R) which  contradicts the previous conclusion that p(B)  < p(R) and, therefore, that A f
B.  The conclusion from this experiment is that players  exhibited  uncertainty  or ambiguity
aversion:  preferring the unambiguous probabilities to the ambiguous.
This experimental evidence is important because in real-world  decision making  situations,
with the  exceptions of games of chance,  probabilities are  often,  at best,  ambiguous.  The
ambiguity arises because of missing information which is relevant to the decision being made
and which could  be known  (e.g.,  the proportion of black and yellow balls  in Ellsberg's 3-
colour problem).  In the context of a government modifying its sanitary  and phytosanitary
regulations,  ambiguity may arise because of the differing opinions  of experts about the correct
interpretation of the available evidence or about the need to acquire additional evidence.  In
such  a situation,  from the perspective  of the government  as  decision  maker,  the  missing
information  which causes  the  ambiguity  is the information  about  which  expert's  belief is
correct.  Such ambiguity may highlight the limited role of scientific  evidence in public policy
decision making.4  Moreover, governments  may be sensitive to, and be influenced by, the
public's perception of the risks, even though it is known that such perceptions are biased.5
More recent results (Heath and Tversky  1991)  tend to show that ambiguity aversion is
displayed by experimental  subjects only under certain experimental  designs.  For example,  if
players have some knowledge of the situation with which they are comparing a chance event,
they tend to back their own prior  (even  if vague) beliefs,  rather than choose the chance
outcome with the unambiguous probability;  but they will choose the latter over the former
4For a critical appraisal of the role of science in the scientific approach to public policy see
Formaini,  particularly Chapter  5.
5Camerer  and Kunreuther discuss a number of sources of bias in judging probabilities.
262outcome  when they  have  no such  personal  knowledge.  Fox  and Tversky  conclude  that
ambiguity  aversion can be interpreted as a reluctance by the decision maker to act on inferior
or missing information and that such reluctance  occurs only when a comparison  is being made
between two situations with different degrees of ambiguity or familiarity.
The implications for public policy of the results by Ellsberg, Heath and Tversky,  and Fox
and Tversky seem clear.  Because policy decisions involve  a choice between the status quo
and a change of policy, the results from comparative situations ought to be the more relevant.
That is,  ambiguity aversion should be observed in real world  situations.  This appears to be
so in those low probability, high consequence situations in which decision makers have limited
experience  (Camerer  and  Kunreuther  1989).  For  example,  governments  may  have  a
preference  for  maintaining  the  status  quo because  they  perceive  that  the  economic  and
political costs of lost opportunities, e.g.,  export revenue from beef foregone,  are less than the
economic and political costs of a mistake,  e.g., the importation  of noxious pests and diseases
with feedgrains.  Hence, there can a be status quo bias in public policy decision making in the
face of uncertainty caused by an aversion to loss (sometimes  referred to as the endowment
effect)6. Another source of status quo bias is transactions costs, i.e.,  the cost of implementing
a  new  policy.  It  is interesting  to  note  in the  Australian  case  described  above  that  the
government chose to implement the cheapest Protocol (P3) despite the greater risks involved.
If SEU theory  is not an  appropriate  description  of uncertainty  averse behavior,  then
neither can it form a sound basis for policy prescription.  The characteristics  of alternative
theories need to be considered.  A substantial number of alternative  theories exist that are
based on assumptions which are thought to be more consistent with some aspects of observed
behaviour,  although not with all aspects.  These theories include,  for  example:  weighted
utility theory;  rank-dependent  expected utility theory;  prospect theory;  maxmin expected
utility theory;  models of complete ignorance  in which probabilities  are replaced with the
maximin criterion;  regret theory;  theories based on a lexicographic  ordering;  theories based
on state-dependent utilities;  and theories based on non-additive probabilities.7
One  of the implications  of ambiguity  aversion  is  that  subjective  probabilities  are  not
additive.  If A  and B are sets of events with A  c B,  then non-additivity  means that p(A  u B) Sp(A) + p(B) -p(A  n B).  "Non-additivity  allows p(A)  and p(B) to measure likelihood of
events (implications of evidence),  while  1 - p(A) - p(B) measures  faith in those likelihoods
(weight of evidence)."  (Camerer  and Weber  1992,  p.  348).  The  axioms of Savage  were
modified  by  Schmeidler  to  incorporate  non-additive  probability,  obtaining  in the  process
Choquet Expected  Utility  [CEU].  In this theory, probabilities (capacities)  are  allowed to
represent both implication  of evidence and weight of evidence.
6A substantial  discussion of status quo bias  in decision making  is given by Samuelson and
Zeckhauser.
7Surveys  and evaluations are provided by Camerer (1992),  Camerer  (1995), Camerer and
Weber, Harish and Camerer, Karni and Schmeidler, Kelsey and Quiggin, and Ward.
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be ranked such that U(a(s,)) > U(a(s 2)) > ... > U(a(s,))  and then the following equation  is
used in place of equation (1) to determine the expected  value of an act a:
CEU(a)=  U(a(s 1))p(s)  +  Y U(a(s,))  s  -pU  . (2)
aEA  i=  2
When the probabilities  are additive and the states are mutually exclusive,  the term in brackets
is p(s,) and CEU becomes SEU (Camerer  1995).
An Example
Assume it is known that the country from which grain is to be imported has two diseases,
d, and d, which are endemic and which are also not present in the importing country, i.e.,  they
would be exotic diseases, if imported and established.  These diseases could be, for example,
fungi, rusts, viruses or bacteria but,  equally,  they could be pests such as insects or weeds.  It
is also known that a treatment (or management regime)  exists which will reduce the chance
of these diseases being released into the environment of the importing country, should they
arrive with the grain.  However, it is recognized that the treatment is not totally effective  in
eradicating  the diseases.  The economic analysis conducted  on the net benefits and costs of
allowing imports to proceed (i.e., the payoffs) would measure social, rather than private, costs
and  benefits  because  of the potential negative  externality  created  by any  release  of these
exotic diseases into the environment,  the costs of their eradication,  and the loss of export
revenues from high-quality grain.
Assume that there are four possible outcomes which the government  could  observe  if
imports were allowed.  These are:  081  an outbreak of disease  c  ; 02  - an outbreak  of
disease d2;  3  an outbreak of both diseases;  and  04  - no outbreak of either disease.  In
order to decide whether or not to remove the quarantine barrier to imports, and assuming that
it is prepared to trade off dollars for potential environmental  damage, the government needs
information  on the payoffs (net social benefits),  U(a(s,)), for each state of nature, i,  as well
as  the  probability  of each  state  occurring, p(s,)  i =  1, 2,  ..., n.  These  payoffs  will  be
determined,  in part,  by the  effect  which  any  established  exotic  disease  may  have  on  the
domestic production of grain and/or on other plants.  The probability of each  state depends:
i]  on whether or not the disease is imported, which in turn depends on the quality of disease
control on shipments leaving the exporting country;  ii] on the success of the treatment of
imported  shipments;  and  iii]  on  the  interaction  of  each  disease  with  the  domestic
environment, e.g.,  whether or not the natural conditions are conducive to the establishment
and spread of the disease should treatment fail to be 100 percent effective for any shipment.
Clearly, these probabilities are extremely ambiguous;  the scientific  community having very
little, if any, information on which to determine their sizes because the conditions under which
they might be calculated have not been observed  before in the importing country.
264Mukerji  has  argued that the axiomatic approach used by  Schmeidler  and by others  in
deriving equation  (2) has not provided an intuitive link between the knowledge available to
the decision maker (his or her epistemic status) and his or her behavior  as represented  by the
use of the Choquet integral.  In developing such intuition, he adds another outcome  space,
0,  which  comprises  more  primitive  elements  than the  elements  of the  payoff space,  4.
Associated  with each O  EQ there is a probability p(o).  There is an "implication mapping,"
P (w),  from the space Q  on to the  space O which is based purely  on the decision maker's
subjective knowledge.  P (0) may or may not map a primitive outcome  oi to a single-element
subset  {Oi} E O, i.e., to a singleton.  Ambiguity is represented by those subsets in P (w) which
are not singletons.  From the probabilities  in the primitive  outcome  space, Q,  the decision
maker is assumed to derive beliefs about the outcomes  in the payoff space O.  The extent to
which  this  can  be  done  unambiguously  depends  on the  extent  of the  decision  maker's
knowledge  as represented by the relationship  between these two  sets.  Limitations on that
knowledge,  together with the decision maker's  awareness  of them,  generate  non-additive
probabilities  in the  payoff space  and  provide  an  intuitive justification  for  using  CEU  to
evaluate decisions under uncertainty aversion.  This framework is sufficiently flexible to allow
the decision maker to reduce ambiguity through acquiring more information which may either
modify the implication mapping, P (o),  or make more precise the elements in the primitive
outcome space,  0,  or in the payoff space, O.
To illustrate  Mukerji's  approach,  assume that the government  has  identified  a  set  of
primitive  outcomes  and four underlying  more primitive  states.  Let w1 be  associated  with
importing disease d1 only,  o2with importing disease d2 only,  w3 with importing both diseases,
and  o4 with no imports of either disease.  However, there needs to be a fifth outcome, (s,  to
represent  some unforseen event, e.g.,  some accident between the shipment prior to unloading
at the wharf and the grain being used,  or a break  in the drought  which may enhance  the
environment for the establishment of disease.
The basic components for this problem are shown in Table 2.  The probabilities, p(w), are
assumed to be obtained from a combination  of scientific research and subjective judgement.
Furthermore,  it is assumed that the government  infers that an outbreak of disease dl,  (01)  is
associated with importing disease d, (ol), the treatment failing and the disease successfully
becoming  established;  and similarly for disease d2. These are  singleton events.  The other
singleton is 04, being the only possible outcome that can be inferred from w 4. However, the
inference from w3 is ambiguous because  it could lead to any one of the outcomes  01,  02,  03
but  the  decision  maker  does not  have  enough  information  to  know  which.  Hence, this
implication mapping, P (w), is said to be ambiguous because not  all outcomes in the payoff
space, O, are singletons  (Mukerji  1995).  Recognition that ambiguity alters behaviour is the
key difference  between CEU and SEU theories because,  in the latter, it is assumed that the
decision  maker  can  assign  an unambiguous  probability  to the  event  03.  In the former,
aversion to ambiguity is captured in the ranking of outcomes and, in general, will lead to a
different  act being chosen.
The next step is to provide a link between the probabilities defined on the space Q with
those that are defined on the space e, the ones directly entering the Choquet sum (equation
(2)).  To do this, Mukerji defines a belief function which is based only on the information
265known to the decision  maker:  p *(A) _{Y  1p(W,) I  F(o)  c  X}, where  X E  2{81,  02,  03,  04}
\  0, a function which is not additive in probabilities  (e.g.,  see  Table 2, p *({0  02,  03})
p *(0).  The implication of  the belief function is that, if for a particular  W,  F (&s)  is not
a singleton,  then the decision  maker is assumed to assign his or her belief to the entire set F
(ow)  and not just to the individual elements  of the set.  Applying  the definition of the belief
function to the outcomes in the payoff space, gives the entries in the final column of Table 2.
Because  r  (),  F (W),  and F ((4) are singletons, the beliefs  associated  with them, p*({1}),
p*({  0 })  and p*({04),  are given byp(.o ), pQ  ),  and po 4), respectively.  But because  F
(o)  is not a singleton,  the belief associated with it is calculated  from the belief function as
p*(O0, 02,  03 })  =p(q) + p(c  ) +p(%)  = 0.30, because the subsets of {0,  02,  031  which
satisFy r  (o3)  are {0j),  {02} and  {01,  02,  03}  respectively.  Note that, because p*({03})-0,
p*({O,  02,  03})  = 0.30  # p*({81})  ±p*({02})  +p*({
0 3})=0.25.
Table  2.  Basic  components  of a problem illustrating Mukerjis approach
_  _  _  p(__  _  r_(W)c  p*Od
W1  0.10  {0}  0.10
(32  0.15  {02}  0.15
03  0.05  {01,  02,  03  }  0.30
W4  0.55  {84}  0.55
(5  0.15  {0,  02,  03,  04}  1
a~l  - the primitive  outcome space;
bp((0)  - the probability distribution of the primitive outcomes;
~(W)  - the implication mapping;  and
dp()-  the belief function on the outcome  space 9.
The information now  missing before the act "allow bulk imports of grain" is evaluated,
is the value of the payoffs  in each state Oi.  In rank order from the largest to the smallest,  let
these be c 4, c2, c 1  and c 3. Mukerji defines a function  4(W; a) which  relates the payoffs  from
an act a  iththe primitive outconmes  (acrQ.  For the singleton  cases,(t)" (i=1,2,4), (b  (a.;-)
2665(3)
E4  (.;  a)  =  (oi;  a) p  ().
i=1
Let cI = 10, c2 =  15, c3 = 5, and c 4 = 20.  Then substituting values from Table 2 into the right-
hand side,  of this expression gives a value of E4  (.; a) = 15.25.  It is important to note that
the ambiguous outcomes,  (03 and  o5s,  by being given the worst possible payoff (c3), introduce
a bias against the act being  chosen ahead of the status quo.  This construction reflects the
decision maker's lack of information about the sizes of  the various conditional probabilities
relating to importing  diseases,  their accidental release,  and their subsequent  establishment.
The matter  of their eradication  has  not been  analyzed  because  the payoff space has  been
defined in terms of observing  an outbreak of disease  only.
It now remains to show that E4  (., a) =  15.25  gives the same result  as that obtained in
calculating the Choquet sum (equation (2)).  The Choquet Expected Utility of the act a "allow
imports of grain"  is calculated from equation (2) as:
CEU(a)  =  U(a(O 4))(0 4)  +  U(a(02))[(0 4U  02)-  p(4)]  (4)
+  U(a(01))[p(04  u  02  U  0)  -(0 4  u  02)]
+  U(a(03))[p(04  u  02  u  01  u0 3)  -p(0 4 U0 2 U  01)]
Substituting the appropriate  values from Table 2 into equation (4), yields CEU = 20[0.55] +
15[0.70 - 0.55] + 10[0.8 - 0.7]  + 5[1 - 0.8] =  15.25. 8  This  equality between  CEU (a)
(equation (4)) and E4  (., a) (equation (3)) arises because once the probabilities associated
with  the  singletons  are  used  in  the  first  three  terms  of both  equations,  the  remaining
(ambiguous) probability,  (1 - 0.55 - 0.15 - 0.10), is attached to the worst-ranked outcome,
in this case c3, thereby reflecting the lack of weight of evidence  and aversion to outbreaks  of
potentially harmful exotic diseases.
This  example  has  highlighted  the  type  and  the  amount  of information  required  to
undertake  a formal  economic  assessment of the risks of importing and  establishing  exotic
diseases  in  the face  of uncertainty.  It has  also  shown  the  value  of using  a  theoretical
framework  in which  probabilities  are  allowed  to  display  weight  of evidence  as  well  as
implication of evidence.  However, in practice governments may not have the patience to wait
for the results of such a full-scale analysis.  Instead, they may opt for a partial  analysis using
a  simpler  approach.  Another  explanation  for  choosing  a  simpler  approach  is that  the
computational burden on an individual  decision maker is just too great to use  some variant
of the SEU approach and that it is rational to substitute a heuristic procedure  (Camerer  1995).
Research  in psychology (e.g.,  that by Tversky et al.  1988) has shown that subjects often use
a lexicographic approach in choosing between acts for which there are a number of attributes.
In doing so, the binary preference relation (f) defined  above is replaced by a lexicographic
preference relation.  Assume that each outcome has only two attributes.  Then a lexicographic
preference relation over acts may be defined as af  b if either a1 > bI or aI = b1 and a2  - b2,
where the subscript  refers to the attribute (Mas-Colell  et  al.  1995).  In the context of the
8Mukerji proves the equality of expressions (3) and (4) for the general case.
267imported  grain  example,  a  government  might  use  a  lexicographic  function  in  which
probabilities  and payoffs are the first and second attributes, respectively.  It would compare
the  probability  of the  outbreak  of an  exotic  disease  (attribute  1) with  some  maximum
acceptable  subjective threshold and would then ignore the economic consequences  (attribute
2)  of  permitting  imports,  should  the  threshold  not  be  reached.  Such  an  approach
approximates  reasonably that used by the Australian Government  in 1994.
Trade Policy  Implications
Trade and  environmental  issues are very  much linked  in the presence  of sanitary  and
phytosanitary barriers to trade.  For island countries such as Australia, the risks from lowering
quarantine  standards are real, not only to the natural environment but also to the production
and export of 'clean'  agricultural  products which may hold a competitive  advantage  and a
price  premium  in  international  markets.  At  the  same  time,  the  provisions  in  the  SPS
Agreement  do impose  some discipline by obliging governments to assess the need for their
own  quarantine regulations  should they choose to set these regulations  at more  stringent
levels than the recognized international  standards.
A summary of the AQIS-sponsored  study of a pest risk assessment undertaken in  1994
illustrated one approach to the conduct of risk assessment.  It is clear that there is substantial
scope for disagreement amongst scientists about the sizes of the probabilities.  This case study
illustrates the role and responsibility of scientists:  their knowledge, their informed judgement
in  the face of few, if any,  experimental  or survey results;  and  the considerable  ambiguity
inherent  in establishing probabilities or beliefs.  The Australian  Government  might believe
itself to be justified in  choosing  the  sub-optimal,  lexicographic  approach  to  establishing
quarantine regulations by identifying only a threshold level for probability and then allowing
imports, if the probability arrived at by a consensus amongst  scientists is below that threshold.
Such a myopic view ignores the wider economic consequences of such an act.
The hypothetical  example provided above illustrates,  in simplified form, the framework
required to undertake an assessment of risk, including the accompanying  economic and trade
consequences.  The benefits from adopting the CEU approach include the following.  First,
it forces government to evaluate the social costs and benefits,  i.e., the payoffs, under different
states of nature.  In principle,  these could be obtained  from simulations with a computable
general  equilbrium  model.  Second,  in assessing  this  economic  information,  the decision
maker is confronted with the need to consider the trade issues,  e.g., the exports foregone in
some  sectors  because  of SPS  restrictions  on  imports in  others.  Therefore,  the model  is
essentially  general  equilibrium  in  approach rather  than the  partial  equilibrium  approach
implicit in the evaluation of only probabilities.  As  comparative advantage  changes through
time, the balance of social costs and benefits of various acts will change, thereby altering the
choice  of the  optimal  act.  And  third,  the  CEU  approach  helps  to  identify  where  the
probabilities  are  vague.  It  allows  the  economic  consequences  of that  vagueness  to  be
measured because of the subsequent changes in ranking and, hence changes in the CEU value
of any act.
268For Australia's trading partners,  it may be difficult to mount a convincing argument  for
more relaxed Australian quarantine regulations for grains or, indeed, for other agricultural
products, given the unavoidable  state of uncertainty or partial ignorance  which abounds with
respect to exotic  pests and  diseases.  Nevertheless,  the benefits  of the CEU approach  to
assessing the SPS barriers to trade has  several advantages over the lexicographic  approach,
despite the transactions costs of evaluation  and implementation.  The most important of these
benefits is that the CEU approach combines probabilities of physical  events with economics
in such a way that the choice of the optimal act reflects  general equilibrium  effects and the
optimal act will alter as the underlying  comparative advantage  of the economy  changes.  The
use of probability thresholds in a lexicographic  approach may allow the economic dimension
to be  ignored.  By including that  economic  dimension through  establishing  payoffs under
different states of nature, less uncertainty-averse behaviour by government may be induced
and  then  sanitary  and  phytosanitary  barriers  to trade  can  be  set  at  safe  minima.  Risk
assessment based on a CEU analysis would then allow the maximum benefits from trade and
comparative  advantage to be realized.
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